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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court err in concluding that John Sampson

tortiously interferred with Defendants' business relations?
2.

Did the lower court err in assessing damages

against John Sampson?
PERTINENT STATUTES AND RULES
This appeal does not focus upon the specific interpretation
of any statutes.

However, the decision of the lower court was

based in part upon interpretation of the Utah Limited Partnership
Act Title 48, Chapter 2, Sections 1-27.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The original Complaint in this case was filed on February
11, 1981 under the title of "Robert J. Osborn, Plaintiff, vs.
Paul H. Richins, Richtron, Inc., Richtron Financial Corporation."
The relief sought was for a judgment giving full faith and credit
to a judgment entered on May 13, 1980 by a circuit court in
Oregon.

Subsequently, a Motion to Amend the Complaint was

granted and plaintiff Robert J. Osborn was replaced with John P.
Sampson and the other listed plaintiffs in this present lawsuit.
Defendants filed a Counterclaim to this Complaint alleging
various defenses to the Oregon judgment and seeking six
affirmative claims for relief on the Counterclaim.
In February of 1983 Judge Douglas Cornaby of the Second
Judicial District Court in and for Davis County entered an order
requiring defendant Paul Richins to obtain a licensed attorney to
represent him rather than allowing him to appear pro se. An
interlocutory appeal was taken to this Court and the Court

accepted jurisdiction as to whether the lower court's order of
representation was proper-

In September of 1983 this Court in

Case No. 19229 granted Appellants1 Motion for Summary Disposition
and found that the lower court's order was overly broad and
violated Appellants' constitutional right to represent himself.
Additional legal proceedings occurred in the lower court
after remand.

Those that are relevant to this appeal will be

specifically stated in the Statement of Facts.

A federal lawsuit

was filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah, Northern Division, Civil No.

NC84-013A on August 28, 1984

by defendant Richins alleging securities and racketeering
violations.
In October 1985 Judge Cornaby suggested to defense counsel
that he may be prejudiced against the defendants and suggested
they request a new judge to hear the matter.

(R.

1685-87).

On

October 1, 1985 an order was entered by Judge Cornaby
transferring the case to Judge David Roth.

(Tr.

1699).

Subsequently Chief Justice Gordon Hall acting through the office
of the State Court Administrator appointed retired Judge Bryant
Croft to further hear and try the case.

The parties stipulated

that the case would be tried in Salt Lake County but would remain
under the jurisdiction of the Second Judicial District.

(Tr.

1752-53).
The case came on for trial before the judge without a jury
on January 27, 1986.

The trial proceeded through the weeks of

January 27, 1986 and concluded on February 11, 1986.

The trial

consisted of eleven days of oral testimony together with 398
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exhibits.
In July of 1986 Judge Croft presented the parties with a
"Memorandum and Summation of Evidence" consisting of 177 pages
and proposed "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Verdict" consisting of 234 pages*
Objections were filed by both parties as to these Findings
and a hearing was held on September 11, 1986.

Subsequently, a

judgment was entered by the lower court finding in favor of
plaintiff Milton Goff and other plaintiffs listed as trustors
against the defendants for $19,057 (R.

2283) as to Plaintiffs'

initial complaint, and finding against plaintiff John Sampson on
the counterclaim in various amounts totaling approximately
$290,000.

(R.

2286-88).

A copy of these judgments is attached

To Appendix I contained following the Argument portion of this
Brief.
(R.

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on November 6, 1986.

2339-40).

Defendants filed a second Notice of Appeal on

November 10, 1986.

(R.

2346-47).

Subsequently, a number of motions were filed in this Court
by both parties as to the composition of the record and attempts
to dismiss Sampson's appeal.

Ultimately, the court denied all of

Defendants1 efforts to dismiss the appeal of Sampson but also
limited the scope of the record to be included to that which was
originally designated by Sampson on June 9, 1987.
During this same period of time a Complaint was filed by
defendant Paul Richins against Sampson with the Utah State Bar.
Thirteen separate claims were made by Richins as to Sampson's
conduct.

On June 15, 1987 the screening panel of the Utah State

Bar issued a private reprimand to plaintiff John Sampson finding
that a more severe penalty was unwarranted since in the
committee's opinion there was no dishonesty, deceit or bad motive
in Mr- Sampsonfs conduct, and that he was at all times acting in
the interest of his limited partner clients.

(A copy of the

private reprimand is attached herein to the Addendum).
On July 15, 1987 all further complaints filed against
Sampson to the Bar Commission were dismissed by Bar counsel.

In

July of 1987 the parties stipulated to a settlement of the
federal court case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
INTRODUCTION
As previously noted the trial of this matter consumed eleven
days of oral testimony.

Judge Croft after taking the matter

under advisement for nearly five months entered extensive factual
findings.

The court prepared what it called a "Memorandum and

Summation of Evidence".

This document contains 177 pages and

essentially is a chronological listing of all events that were
documented in this litigation.
The second document filed by the Court is entitled "Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Verdicts." This document
contains 234 pages and is contained in a separate volume to this
Brief designated Appendix II.

The format of this document

consists of 156 pages of findings, 49 pages of conclusions of
law, and 27 pages of verdicts.

For purposes of this Brief

reference will be made separately to the findings (hereinafter
referred to as "Findings"); to the conclusions of law
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(hereinafter referred to as "Conclusions"); and to the verdicts
on both the plaintiffs1 and defendants1 claims (hereinafter
referred to as "Verdicts").

The page of the court's opinion

rather than the assigned record page will be referred to for
convenience•
Plaintiffs' counsel has thoroughly reviewed the transcript
in this case together with the exhibits that were filed by both
parties.

With the exception of evidence relating to the amount

of damages, Plaintiffs believe that the lower court did an
admirable job in summarizing the probative facts.

The Findings,

therefore, are essentially not contested by Plaintiffs in that
they accurately reflect the events which transpired throughout
these business dealings.

It would therefore be needless

repetition to refer to the underlying record rather than to the
opinion of the lower court in areas where no dispute of the
record has occurred.
As to the issue of damages, however, Plaintiffs believe
that there is neither evidentiary support nor sufficient findings
in the opinion submitted by the lower court to justify the
imposition against Plaintiffs.

This again, however, is an

omission which again can have no citation to the record.
Thus, after reviewing this case in detail it has now become
apparent that Plaintiffs' effort to supplement the transcript
record in this case was essentially a needless gesture.

First, a

review of the original designation by Plaintiff as compared with
the actual transcriptions reveals that nearly all of the
transcript is included in that original designation.
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Second, and

more important, however, the Findings of the lower court as to
probative facts are, as argued by Defendants1 counsel during oral
argument, sufficient to base both the appeal and the cross-appeal
upon and therefore the internal decision of the court will be the
focus of this appeal rather than the underlying record*
While Plaintiffs do not disagree with the overwhelming
majority of probative facts found by the lower court, Plaintiffs
do disagree with the findings relating to ultimate conclusionary
facts and conclusions of law.

Thus, for example, while not

disagreeing that Sampson made certains statements concerning his
interpretation of the partnership agreement Plaintiffs disagree
that such statements constituted improper means of economic
interference thereby justifying liability*
It is obviously impossible to duplicate in this Statement of
Facts all of the events which Judge Croft methodically listed in
his prepared documents.

Fortunately, only some of these facts

are relevant to the appeal and the cross-appeal now before this
Court.

Therefore, Plaintiffs will chronologically list the

events which occurred in this litigation as specifically found by
the lower court.

At the same time, in order to better understand

the legal conclusions of the lower court, Sampson will cite to
the Conclusions and other analytical comments made by the lower
court as to those facts.

It is hoped that this process will

simplify the examination of this voluminous record for both the
appeal and cross-appeal.
THE PARTIES
Plaintiff and appellant John P. Sampson is an attorney at
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law licensed to practice in the State of Utah and residing in
Ogden, Utah.

Plaintiff Milton R. Goff is an individual residing

in Weber County, was a limited partner of one of the entities
involved in this lawsuit, and was trustee for a group of
individuals listed as plaintiffs in the court below.

For

purposes of this appeal, Goff and the other plainiffs will only
be referred to when necessary to understand their role in the
series of events.

Claims levied by them and against them will

not be addressed.
The Respondents Richtron, Inc., Richtron General, Richtron
Financial Corporation and Frontier Investments are all Utah
corporations organized by respondent Paul H. Richins and his wife
Sherry.

Richins was president of each corporation and Sherry was

secretary-treasurer during the years from October 15, 1973 to
March 1, 1980.
Richins established at least twenty-six limited partnerships
in which either Richtron, Inc. or Richtron General was made the
sole general partner in such limited partnerships.

Through

Richins1 efforts approximately 130 parties invested in and became
limited partners in one or more of such partnerships.

Limited

partnership agreements were executed between a general partner,
for which Paul Richins signed as president of the general
partner, and certain named individual partners, the number of
which varied from three to twenty-two in the respective limited
partnerships.
Each limited partnership was a farm property, each of which
was purchased under a purchase agreement by either Richtron, Inc.
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or Richtron Financial Corporation who appeared as buyers and the
original owners from whom each property was purchased who
appeared as sellers.

The Richtron buyer of each property would

then sell the property to a particular limited partnership under
a sales agreement in which such limited partnership appeared as
buyer.
In each such resale contract there was a substantial markup
in the purchase price to be paid by the limited partnership for
the farm property, together with an increase in the interest rate
to be paid on the purchase price.

Such resale agreements were

all signed by Paul Richins for both the buyer and the seller,
with him signing as president of the general partner of the
limited partnership making the purchase and as president of the
Richtron corporation making the resale to the limited
partnership.
THE CLAIMS
This lawsuit began on February 11, 1981 under the title of
"Robert J. Osborn, Plaintiff, vs. Paul H. Richins, Richtron,
Inc., and Richtron Financial Corporation." The relief sought was
for a judgment giving full faith and credit to a judgment entered
on May 13, 1980 in a court of Oregon.

For purposes of this

appeal it is unnecessary to detail further procedural facts
relating to plaintiffs1 initial claim since neither party is
contesting the decision rendered in favor of Goff and his
trustors.
The Amended Counterclaim filed by Defendants initially
alleged six causes of action against defendant Sampson.
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The

first claim alleged that from about June 11, 1980 until October
7, 1981 Sampson acted as legal counsel for defendants, who in the
first claim are identified as Richins, Richtron, Inc., Richtron
General and RFC. The Counterclaim alleged that Sampson undertook
to represent partners and partnerships in matters adverse to
these defendants; endeavored to obtain interests in various
enumerated judgments or debts owed by defendants for the purpose
of using them to defendants1 detriment; utilized confidential
information received while representing defendants to their
detriment; and alleged that such conduct constituted conflicts of
interest, fraudulent attempts to injure defendants, breach of
fiduciary duty and trust upon which the attorney-client
relationship is based.

(Findings, pp. 29-30).

The second claim alleges Sampson, as counsel for defendants,
failed to exercise reasonable care or skill ordinarily possessed
and exercised by members of the legal profession; that he acted
far beyond the scope of his express and implied delegated duties
and utilized confidential information acquired while representing
defendants.

(Findings, pp. 30-31).

The third claim, based upon allegations of slander and
defamatory statements, was abandoned by defendants during the
trial.

The fourth claim for relief alleged that Sampson

intentionally and maliciously interferred with Richins1 right to
earn a livelihood as a syndicator of limited partnership
interests and interferred with the other corporate defendants1
abilities to make existing contractual relations and economic
expectancies.

(Findings, pp. 31-32).
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The fifth claim for relief alleged that between June 14,
1980 and January 15, 1981 Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General
withdrew as general partners of twenty-four named limited
partnerships which obligated the general partner of each to wind
up and terminate the affairs of the limited partnerships.

It

further alleged that Sampson who was purportedly acting as
successor general partner deliberately interferred with the
rights of the general partners to wind up the affairs and
liquidate the limited partnerships.
requested.

(Findings, pp.

An accounting was

32-33).

In the sixth claim for relief defendants assert that by
reasons of all of the conduct alleged in the other claims that
they have suffered irreparable injury for which there is no
adequate legal remedy and thus seek injunctive relief.
Defendants requested both compensatory as well as punitive
damages under the various claims asserted.

(Findings, p. 33).

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1. Finding: Between October 15, 1973 and March 1, 1980
Richins established at least 25 limited partnerships for the
purpose of operating farms throughout the intermountain area.
(Findings, p. 28). Each limited partnership had its own
separate agreement signed by Richins as president of either
Richtron, Inc. or Richtron General as general partner and by each
investor in the particular limited partnership. The content of
each agreement was identical, except as to dates, description of
the property, the names of the investors and the amounts of the
initial capital.
2. Finding: As of May, 1980, the evidence suggests a
bleak outlook for the future in the overall operation of the
limited partnerships by Richins. This was caused by (1) the
failure of many limited partners to pay their assessed capital
contribution which they had agreed to in their respective
partnership agreements and (2) the failure of Richins as
president of the general partners of each partnership to fulfill
the duties and responsibilities he had to the limited partners
under the partnership agreements. (Findings, pp. 54-57).
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The court listed numerous problems with the farm properties
in the latter part of 1979 and the early part of 1980,
(Findings, pp. 60-64). In summary, the court stated that by May
of 1980 there was dissatisfaction of the partnership affairs
together with a lack of meaningful information from the general
partner, the existence of judgments, troubles and tax problems, a
state security commission investigation, a revocation of RFCfs
certificate of authority in Oregon, the failure of many limited
partners to pay their assessments and Richins1 failure to do
anything about it. (Findings, p. 72).
Conclusion: By May of 1980 Richins had so mismanaged
partnership affairs that it did not have sufficient funds to pay
installments owed to RFC, so RFC could not pay its installment
obligation to the contract sellers. Substantial judgment were
obtained for failure to pay partnership obligations. Partners
were angry because of Richins1 failure to follow the partnership
agreement upon assessment and failure to pay; to give an audited
annual report to each, to have the properties appraised by a
qualified appraiser and to give the partners a report of the
holdings and to advise them regarding advances and obligations
with respect thereto. (Verdict, p. 229).
3. Finding: On or about May 21, 1980 Richins had his
first contact with Sampson concerning this action. Sampson
called Richins, stating he was calling on behalf of Milton Goff
and had some questions about the Catlow Valley Property—one of
the limited partnerships. Richins told Sampson he was going to
call a meeting of the Catlow Valley limited partners to tell them
about the judgments that had been entered against the partnership
and other problems. (Findings, p. 7).
4. Finding: On May 29, 1980 a meeting of the limited
partners of the seven Catlow Valley farm partnerships was
attended by about thirty limited partners. Its purpose was to
discuss the critical financial condition of those partnerships
and the need to act as to a sheriff's sale set for the following
month. Richins advised those present that $140,000 had to
be raised immediately to stop the sale and that an additional
$30,000 to $50,000 was needed to continue drilling water wells.
The total amount of money then needed to pay the obligations owed
was computed at $240,000. (Findings, p. 63).
5. Finding: Sampson representing limited partners
Goff and Kohler suggested that RFC file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
as an alternative. He also stated that he did not think RFC
could keep the markup equity because it was a breach of fiduciary
responsibility for a general partner to buy property at one price
and to sell it to a partnership at a profit. This was a theme
which Sampson repeatedly expressed in the months and years ahead.
Richins disagreed with Sampsonfs conclusion but did agree to file
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy on behalf of RFC. (Findings, pp. 36-37).
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Conclusion: The court states that it does not believe
that the markup in the contract price for which RFC or Richtron,
Inc. sold farm property to a partnership by contract was a breach
of fiduciary duty which rendered such contract or the markup
illegal or void. The statement by Sampson was therefore
erroneous. (Conclusion, p. 189).
6. Finding: It was agreed at this meeting that $17,000
would be raised by the limited partners for the purpose of
attorneys1 fees and other expenses. When the limited partners
raised the question as to who would have custody of the funds
Richins suggested that Ken Hansen be appointed for that purpose.
(Findings, pp. 64-5).
7. Finding: On May 30, 1980 a meeting of the Snowville
limited partnership was held at which time they employed Sampson
as legal counsel for the partnership and requested Sampson to
take necessary steps to relieve Richtron as general partner and
to liquidate in an orderly manner. They decided they would not
pay contributions requested by Richins until after an audit was
completed but would make contributions to meet the July 1st
payment on the property if advised to do so by Sampson. It was
also agreed to request the Springfield and Morland limited
partnerships to do likewise. (Findings, p. 64).
8. Finding: On June 2 and June 5, Richins as the general
partner in the partnerships executed quit claim deeds by which
all of the limited partnerships conveyed to RFC the real property
previously acquired by them. These deeds were executed without
advising any investor or partnerships. The apparent basis for
such deeds was the failure of the partnerships to keep current
the payments due RFC on the real estate contracts by which the
partnerships had purchased their farm lands from RFC.
Conclusion: The undisclosed execution by Richins as
president of the general partner of the quit claim deeds on or
about June 2 and 5, 1980 which deeds purported to convey all
partnership properties to RFC was contrary to law and void. This
effort would have essentially deprived the partnerships of their
only assets making it impossible for them to carry on ordinary
business. This action violated §48-2-9(2) of the Utah Code
Annotated. It is difficult to conceive of any circumstance
falling more closely into the statutory provision requiring
notice and written consent of limited partners than the secretive
conveyance of the partnership farms to a third party.
(Conclusion, pp. 168-69).
9. Finding: On June 5, 1980 Richins prepared and
signed as president of Richtron, Inc., the general partner,
eighteen promissory notes which obligated the limited
partnerships of the note issued to pay Richtron, Inc., Richtron
General, or RFC, or their respective successors or assigns, the
greater amount of the principal sum named therein or the total of
the aggregate advances made to the partnership by the holder as
_1 O -

defined in the limited partnership agreement.
pp. 65-66).

(Findings,

Conclusion: The court found that while the general
partners advanced funds under the partnership agreement they did
not comply with Article V{1)(c) of the various agreements since
there were no loan instruments prepared when such advances were
made. The court specifically found that the promissory notes
dated June 5, 1980 did not constitute a loan instrument as used
in the partnership agreement. The money, therefore, could only
be repaid at the time of termination of the partnership assuming
sufficient assets were still available.
(Findings, pp. 102-03).
10. Finding: On June 9, 1980 the Blackfoot limited
partners had a meeting attended by both Richins and Sampson.
Sampson stated his opinion that the markup on the propert was a
breach of fiduciary duty and that Richtron was not entitled to
the repayment of advances made to the limited partnership.
Sampson throughout these events continually maintained that the
general partners were not entitled to repayment of the advances
they allegedly made. (Findings, p. 66).
Conclusion: Sampson's advice as to the repayment of
advances was erroneous. While the money was not due and owing to
the general partner immediately it was a legitimate debt upon
termination of the partnership. (Conclusions, pp. 166, 170).
11. Finding: At the June 9, 1980 Blackfoot director
meeting some of the limited partners expressed their
dissatisfaction of Richins'performance. Richins stated that if
they were not satisfied they could repay the advances, agree to
pay in full for the personal property and could elect a new and
more compatible general partner to take Richtron's place. He
said that if they refused he might withdraw Richtron as a
general partner and effect a dissolution and liquidation thereby
forcing settlement of accounts and he would not consent to the
election of a new general partner. On June 10 he sent a letter
to the limited partners of Blackfoot and stated he was filing
notice of Richtron, Inc.'s withdrawal as general partner. He
demanded they repay advances of $25,000 and that they elect a
new general partner to fill the vacancy but also stated that
the partnership was terminated and its affairs were to be
wound up. (Findings, p. 66-67).
Conclusion: The court stated that Richins gave contrary
instructions when he informed the Blackfoot partners as well as
two others that he had withdrawn as the general partner and that
they should go ahead and elect a new general partner while at the
same time telling them that the partnership had been terminated
and that the assets would have to be distributed. This raised
confusion in the minds of the limited partners as to what they
were expected to do. He placed his own erroneous interpretation
of §48-2-20, U.C.A. (Conclusion, pp. 170-171).

-l.l-

12. Finding: On June 26, 1980 a large number of
limited partners met with Sampson and Richins to discuss the
problems taking place. Richins advised them that he had advanced
$350,000 and that many limited partners had failed to pay their
assessments. He stated that $300,000 was needed in the immediate
future and $60,000 was needed immediately. Sampson stated that
he was present at the meeting to advise Kohler and Goff about
their pension and profit sharing investments. After several
heated discussions it was agreed that Sampson and his associates
would buy out Richins for $700,000 with an interest rate of 13%.
(Findings, p. 37-38, 68).
13. Finding: Richins told Sampson that he anticipated
creditors filing lawsuits during the next few months. Sampson
said he would answer them and stall off the creditors and that
once the agreement had been consummated he would like to continue
as legal counsel for Richtron. The limited partners all agreed
Sampson should represent their interests. At the same time with
the probability of a settlement existing, at the insistence of
active limited partners and with Richins1 consent Sampson became
the recipient of partnership funds paid by some limited partners
for assessments. He was charged with maintaining control over
how such funds were to be spent with such initial arrangements
including an agreement for Sampson to pass the funds through to
Richins for payment of pressing obligations. (Findings, pp.
38-39, 68).
Conclusion: Legally Richins had no authority to consent
to Sampson's role in the collection of funds nor did the limited
partners have the authority to hire a lawyer to represent them.
However, in view of the tentative agreement for a settlement
these factors should not be given much weigh in determining the
legality of what Sampson did in the months that followed.
(Conclusions, p. 171).
14. Finding: During the summer and early fall of 1980
Sampson undertook various legal matters on behalf of the limited
partners and the general partners. These included such acts as
answering lawsuits, attempting to negotiate settlements, and
attending trustee sales. All of these activities are outlined in
the court1s Findings, pages 39-43.
Conclusion: The court concluded that during the summer
and fall of 1980 an attorney-client relationship existed between
Sampson, Richins, and Richtron companies. The court found that
the breach of fiduciary duty violated ethical standards adopted
by the Bar Association and is part of the overall conduct of
Sampson said to be tortious. (Conclusion, pp. 164-65).
15. Finding: On October 2, 1980 Sampson sent to all
investors a copy of the completed compromise and settlement
agreement and urged them to sign it and return it immediately to
Richins. The agreement as drafted had received the approval of
both Richins and Sampson and afforded the gateway through which
-14-

the controversies could be resolved. Although many limited
partners signed it, others did not and so this agreement was
never consummated. (Findings, pp. 68-69).
16. Finding: Following falure of having the settlement
agreement consumated, Richins on November 13, 1980 drafted and
executed a notice of withdrawal of the general partner which he
then sent to the limited partners of six partnerships. On
January 6, 1981 identical notices were mailed to the limited
partners of 18 other partnerships. (Findings, p. 69). By
separate letter Richins advised the limited partners that the
general partner had withdrawn, the partnerships were terminated,
and affairs would be wound up as indicated in the partnership
agreements. (Id.).
Conclusion: Richins1 statement in these notices that
the partnerships had automatically terminated was erroneous.
Article V of the partnership agreement does not state that
withdrawal of a general partner automatically dissolves the
partnership. Article VII of the agreement allows the limited
partners to elect a new general partner upon the withdrawal of
the old general partner. (Findings, pp. 70-72). The court
further stated that while Richins relied upon §48-2-20, U.C.A.
that this section was not applicable to this case and that it was
necessary to look instead to the certificate of partnership
agreement as to the responsibility arising out of the withdrawal
of a general partner. As a matter of law, the limited partners
had the right to elect a new general partner without terminating
the partnership. (Conclusions, pp. 177-78).
17. Finding: Although Richins stated that he would
immediately begin to wind up all of the partnership entities
there is no evidence that he undertook any such action. The
court stated, "We search in vain for evidence of any affirmative
action by Richins to have the general partners undertake the
promised wind-up of partnership affairs." (Findings, pp.
69-70) .
Conclusion: Of great importance as to determining the
losses to the various partnerships was Richins' own failure to
undertake efforts to wind up partnership affairs and bring about
dissolution and termination with any resulting benefits to all
concerned. The courts were there to help him do so but he never
used them for that purpose. Even in this litigation Richins did
not seek a windup and dissolution by this court. (Verdict, pp.
229-30) .
18. Finding: In December of 1980 Sampson sent out
letters to all of the limited partners requesting that they
return to him a signed power of attorney which would give him the
ability to vote their rights. He informed them that settlement
had failed and that it was necessary to sign these powers in
order to remove Richins and his companies as general partners and
to retain the properties and preserve legal remedies. The powers
-1 £ _

of attorney stated that they were to be irrevocable for six
months and to continue on until otherwise notified. (Findings,
p. 76) .
19. Finding: At this same time Sampson incorporated the
John P. Sampson professional corporation and using the powers
of attorney given to him by the various limited partnership
undertook to vote the Richtron companies out as general partners
and voted his own professional corporation in as the new
substitute general partner. Sampson executed several documents
to this effect and recorded noticies of substitution as an
amendment to the certificate of partnership agreement. In March
1981 he again executed other documents attempting to substitute
his professional corporation as the general partner. (Findings,
pp. 76-77) .
Conclusion: The court ruled that as a matter of law
Sampson did not legally substitute his professional corporation
for that of the defendants since §48-2-24(d) requires that an
amended certificate be signed and sworn to by all limited
partners. Since it was only signed by Sampson the attempted
substitution was invalid ab initio as not being in conformity
with law and had no force or effect in removing the Richtron
general partners. (Conclusions, p. 182).
20. Finding: A stipulated judgment had been entered
in Oregon against the defendants on behalf of Robert Osborn. The
judgment was entered on May 13, 1980 for $75,683.00. (Findings,
p. 6). During January of 1981 Sampson negotiated with the
attorney for Osborn and purchased the Osborn judgment for
$20,000 down and $20,000 more to be paid in three months. A
complaint was filed on February 11, 1981 with Osborn being named
as plaintiff seeking enforcement of the Oregon judgment. In
March the amended complaint was amended to reflect Sampson's name
as the real party in interest. Subsequently, the original
assignment of the suit was revoked because of Sampson's failure
to pay the remaining $20,000. Later, however, the assignment was
reinstated upon payment by Goff on behalf of other limited
partners who are now named parties to this lawsuit. (Findings,
pp. 10-13) .
Conclusion: The court concluded that the purchase of
this judgment by Sampson was in direct violation of §78-51-27
U.C.A. which prohibits attorneys from purchasing such judgments.
Further, when Sampson obtained the second assignment on behalf of
Goff and the other trustees he violated the section a second
time. (Findings, pp. 109-10).
21. Finding: At this time the RFC bankruptcy
proceedings were still alive and Sampson was notified by the
Bankruptcy Court that a professional legal corporation was not
authorized to become a general partner in an agricultural
enterprise. On March 23, 1981 Sampson, incorporated AG
Management, Inc. of which he was one of its incorporators,
-1 £ -

directors and the president. After doing so Sampson took
steps to substitute AG Management for his PC as general
partner of each partnership. (Findings, p. 78),
Conclusion: Sampson's attempted substitution of AG
Management as general partner of each partnership in place of
Sampsonfs PC without filing an amended certificate showing
such change was contrary to law, a nullity, and gave AG
Management no authority to act as such, (Conclusions, p. 192).
22. Finding: At the end of 1980 and into 1981 Sampson
repeatedly solicited funds from the limited partners directing
that the funds be sent to him and not to Richins. He determined
the manner in which such funds were to be used and did so in the
months and years ahead. From the end of June 1980 through
November 1982 he received and disbursed at least $645,000 from
and for the limited partners and their partnerships. The
evidence showed that Sampson kept detailed records of his
receipts and disbursements. (Findings, p. 79).
23, Finding: Sampson, as counsel for Goff and certain
limited partners, attended an IRS tax sale on October 29, 1982
relating to Richins and Richtron interests. As the only bidder
they bid in $40,000 to purchase all of Richins1 claims in the
partnerships, the Richins entities, the purchase and resale
contracts and stock in the Richtron companies. These assets the
IRS has purportedly taken by some thirty-five IRS seizures and
levies. (Findings, pp. 81-2).
240 Finding: In a case filed in the District Court in
Davis County entitled "Blackfoot Farms, et al. v. Paul H.
Richins, Richtron Inc., RFC, et al." Judge Duffy Palmer entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on November 24, 1982
wherein he ruled that AG Management was not the general partner
of any of the partnerships; that Richtron, Inc. and Richtron
General were the liquidating general partners; that
notwithstanding their withdrawals they were still in control of
the partnership; and that the partnership certificates were never
amended to admit AG Management ^s a general partner. (Findings,
pp. 80-1).
25. Finding: Notwithstanding Sampson's setback in the
face of Judge Palmer's ruling, Sampson continued to lay claim to
and hold for his clients all of the Richins and Richtron rights
and interests in the partnerships and their properties,
including, as noted, all stock in the Richtron companies, doing
so by reason of the procedural consequences of the IRS tax sale.
(Findings , p. 32) .
26. Finding: Emphasis was added to the legality of
Sampson's claims by two subsequent court rulings made by Judge
Cornaby in the District Court of Davis County, one on December
27, 1982, and the second on July 21, 1983. In both cases Judge
Cornaby ruled that the IRS sale was valid, that Goff was the

purchaser of all Richins and Richtron property interest as
evidenced and described by the IRS1 certificate of sale, and that
such sale covered all property interest, all causes of action,
and all rights to wind up the affairs of the limited partners of
which the Richtron companies had been general partners,
(Findings, p. 82).
27. Finding: On May 16, 1984 Judge David Winder of
the United States District Court for Utah entered an order which
fully and unequivocably voided the IRS tax sale declaring that
Goff had no interest in the capital stock of the Richtron
companies, in the right of those companies to wind up partnership
affairs, nor the right to institute causes of action. (Findings,
p. 83) .
28. Finding: After losing the IRS ruling Sampson and
Richins wrote letters to each other as well as the limited
partners at which time Sampson said that all the farms had been
foreclosed upon and that they had been purchased directly from
the individual sellers and therefore Richins and his companies no
longer had any interest. The list of foreclosures introduced by
Richins at trial indicates that all farms had been foreclosed
upon by the dates of these letter exchanges. (Findings, p. 8 5 ) .
29. Finding: Although Judge Winder's ruling was on
May 16, 1984 Richins took no action to vacate Judge Cornaby's
prior orders until January 3, 1985 when he finally filed a motion
to do so. Based upon Judge Winder's decision, Judge Cornaby on
February 15, 1985 made a ruling vacating his prior two orders
because they had been based upon the assumption that the IRS sale
was valid.
(Findings, pp, 83-4).
30. Finding: There is no evidence in the record as to
what became of various partnership properties although Richins
testified at trial that none of the limited partners to his
knowledge ever received any return on their investments. It is a
reasonable inference that payments due to the original owners as
sellers were not made; that those contracts fell into default;
that a substantial reason therefore was that no money was
available to meet such payments, and that the probable reason was
the failure of many limited partners to pay the assessments
necessary to obtain the funds to meet those payments. (Findings,
p. 86) .
31. Finding: From June 27, 1980 to October 29, 1984
approximately $1,522,000 of unduplicated funds were deposited in
the various accounts over which Sampson had control. (Verdict,
p. 221). It is clear from the evidence that most of the funds
that passed through Sampson's hands were paid out on partnership
expenses. There was no evidence in the record that Sampson ended
up with the partnership assets and in fact the only evidence
shows that the properties were foreclosed upon. (Verdict, pp.
221-23) .
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V E R D I C T S E N T E R E D BY THE C O U R T
T h e d e c i s i o n o f; J u d g e C" r o f t a s t o p 1 a i n tiff's initial
Complaint is simplistic in that it p r o v i d e s a judgment against
the d e f e n d a n t s for $ 1 9 , 0 5 7 . 4 2 in favor of the p l a i n t i f f s
exc 1 ucling J i:;hn F . Sampson .

(R

at 2 3 - 2 6 ) .

The d e c i s i o n r e l a t i n g to the c o u n t e r c l a i m is essentially
summarized on pages 233 and 234 of the decision,,

The u n d e r l y i n g

r e a s o n i n g s u p p o r t i n g these v e r d i c t s , when it is stated in the
document at all, is found t h r o u g h o u t the F i n d i n g s and C o n c l u s i o n s
as well

special section entitled "Verdict".

Since these

v e r d i c t s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d e x t e n s i v e l y in the A r g u m e n t p o r t i o n of
the Brief the f o l l o w i n g s u m m a r y is offered for an o v e r v i e w of
what the court reasoned*
1.

The court found that as to Count I Sampson violated the

attorney-client, r e l a t i o n s h i p in that he r e p r e s e n t e d some of the
d e f e n d a n t s d u r i n g 1980 but the court found that no evidence of
damage was p r e s e n t e d as to any of the c o u n t e r c l a i m s asserted by
D e f e n d a n t s and therefore no award was given as to the First
Count,

(Findings, p p . 4 4 - 5 1 ; C o n c l u s i o n s , p p . 1 6 5 - 6 5 ) .

2 . As to

rrti

'. n 1: 1 1 t h e < : o u r t: f o u n d t h at S a m p s o n was

n e g l i g e n t in the h a n d l i n g of v a r i o u s l a w s u i t s .

The court

awarded R i c h i n s $2,027.40 for the costs incurred in setting
aside a default judgrn*-:. • v . :. .ampson allowed to be entered
against him3.

(Findings, p p .

5 2 - 3 ; C o n c l u s i o n s , pp.

165-66).

The F o u r t h Claim for interference ^f c o n t r a c t u a l

r e l a t i o n s h i p s is the heart of the court's d e c i s i o n relating to
the c o u n t e r c l a i m .

As to R i c h i n s i n d i v i d u a l l y

1

Q-

(A) the court found

that Sampson did not interfere with Richins right to earn a
livelihood or with anticipated opportunities for employment.
(Findings, p. 90) .
The court did find, however, that Sampson intentionally
interferred with the other defendants1 existing and potential
economic relationships with each of the limited partners under
their respective partnership agreements(B)

(Findings, p. 93)•

The court considered RFC to have two potential claims:

first, as the buyer and ultimate seller of the various farms to
the limited partnerships, and second, as a limited partner itself
in the Richfield Farm Limited Partnership and in Catlow Valley No,
2 and No.

6.

The court concluded that even if Sampson had never

appeared on the scene it was not probable that RFC could have
prevented foreclosure of the original purchase contracts based
upon the existing facts and circumstances disclosed by the
evidence.

(Verdict, pp.

228-30).

The court awarded $100

nominal damages to RFC for its interest as the seller of the farm
property contracts.
The court did, however, award RFC $30,974.50 for its
interest in the Catlow Valley and Richfield Limited Partnerships.
The court concluded that Sampson ignored its rights as limited
partners in these partnerships, sent no notices to either, and
offered no evidence as to what happened to the interests of the
limited partnerships thereby causing a loss to RFC in the amount
of their respective capital interest in those partnerships.
(Verdict, pp. 228-30).
(C) The remaining defendants seeking damages against
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Sampson were Richtron, Inc. and Ri chtron General which acted as
general partners for the partnerships-

Richtron, Inc. was

awarded $4,222.50 as a limited partner in the Pleasant
Valley Partnership on the same basis as had been given to RFC on
its two limited partnership interests.
In addition, however, an award of $250,000 was made in
of these general partners,

favor

The court specifically rejected the

general partners' claims for repayment of advances made to the
limited partnerships.

The court found that there was no

preponderance of evidence to show that but for Sampsonfs efforts
the partnerships would have in fact been solvent to pas the
advances made by the general partners at the termination of the
partnerships,

(Findings, p.

105; Conclusions, pp.

215-16).

As

tc • the genera 1 partners1 claim for a ten percent of profits from
the limited partnerships the court concluded that the evidentiary
record in the case was purely speculative as to whether any
profits would be in existence at the time of termination.
(Findings, p.

133; Conclusions, p.

193, 204).

The court at: the conc 1 usion of :i ts opinion made the
following statement:
As stated before, damages are in tort, not in
contract, rendering liability for damages for either
the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or
consequential for which the tortious interference is
the legal cause. I think as to some claim for relief
damages, of at least a consequential nature, have been
shown with a reasonable degree of certainty by a
preponderance of the evidence. (Verdict, p. 232).
Thus, the award of $250,000 is based upon consequential damages
allegedly suffered by the general partners as a result of
Sampson's wrongful interference.

The court rejected the affirmative defenses raised by
Sampson including waiver and estoppel and held that the facts did
not evidence any intent by Richins to waive his control over the
partnership and step aside in favor of Sampson.

(Conclusions, p.

205) .
4.

The court rejected Richins request under his Fifth Claim

for Relief that an accounting be ordered.

The court stated that

any further accounting would not add to the certainty of the
evidence.
5.

The court also denied Richins Sixth Claim for Relief for

an injuntion on the basis that it was not supported by any
preponderance of the evidence and that there was nothing shown
that could be enjoined.
6.

(Conclusions, p. 164).

Defendants in their cross-appeal are seeking punitive

damages which were denied to them by the trial court.

The court

found that Sampson in good faith attempted to negotiate
settlement with Richins for the benefit of the limited
partnerships (Findings, p. 140). Sampson honestly believed
that the powers of attorney authorized him to exercise the vote
of each partner and that he therefore legally removed the
Richtron general partners and substituted his own PC and then
his AG Management as general partners.

Also, there was no

direct proof that Sampson was aware of the provisions of
§78-51-27 which rendered the acquisition of the Osborn judgment
a violation of law even though it would not have been for anyone
else.

(Findings, p.

30, 142).

The court found that Sampson operated the partnership under

the p o w e r of a t t o r n e y a u t h o r i z a t i o n u n t i l it w a s r u l e d
A t that t i m e , h o w e v e r , S a m p s o n had pi irehased

invalid.

the d e f e n d a n t s '

i n t e r e s t in an IRS sale and J u d g e C o r n a b y r u l e d on two
that the s a l e s w e r e v a l i d .

occasions

(Findings, p. 1 4 1 ) .

Th e c o ii r t s t a t e d :
O n e w o n d e r s w h a t R i c h i n s t h o u g h t the p a r t n e r s h i p s
w e r e e x p e c t e d to d o . T h e R i c h t r o n g e n e r a l p a r t n e r s '
w i t h d r a w a l h a d left them w i t h an u n c e r t a i n f u t u r e .
M a n y l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h a d s o u g h t l e g a l a d v i c e from
S a m p s o n and h e g a v e it to t h e m .
T h e f a c t that he e r r e d
in the a d v i c e g i v e n them d o e s n o t r e n d e r h i s a c t i o n s
malicious.
(Findings, p. 1 4 3 ) .
The j u d g m e n t of J u d g e C r o f t w a s e n t e r e d on O c t o b e r 9, 1 9 8 6 .
It is from this j u d g m e n t t h a t b o t h p l a i n t i f f

and d e f e n d a n t s

now

appeal.
S U M M A R Y OF
1.

ARGUMENT

T h e c o u r t e r r e d in f i n d i n g S a m p s o n h a d

tortiously

i n t e r f e r e d w i t h def e n d a n t s * re 1 ationshii ps w i t h the
partners,

F i r s t , there w a s no f a c t u a l e v i d e n c e

h a d the evil m o t i v e n e c e s s a r y to find
Second

limited

to show

Sampson

"an i m p r o p e r purpose. 1 1

the " m e a n s " r e l i e d u p o n by the t r i a l c o u r t w e r e n o t of

the q u a l i t y n e c e s s a r y to j u s t i f y t o r t l i a b i l i t y .
c o u r t p r o p e r l y a p p l i e d a "good faith

A l s o , had

s t a n d a r d " , m a n y of the

of S a m p s o n w o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n c o n s i d e r e d as w r o n g f u l

of d e f e n d a n t s witli the l i m i t e d

w o u l d h a v e m o s t p r o b a b l y t e r m i n a t e d w i t h or w i t h o u t
presence.

F i n a l l y , the c o u r t s h o u l d h a v e found

w a i v e d any r i gl it to c o m p l a i n and are e s t o p p e d
injury.

acts

means.

T h i r d , the c o u r t erred in f i n d i n g c a u s a t i o n w h e n the facts
that the r e l a t i o n s h i p

the

showed

partners
Sampsonfs

defendants
from

claiming

2.

The court erred in awarding $250,000 consequential

damages without specifically entering findings as to its
composition.

There was no evidence of consequential damages that

the court found nor was there any presented by defendants at
trial.

Finally, the award of the capital investment as limited

partners for Richtron and RFC was erroneous since there was no
evidence of their values at Sampson's entry, and is unfair to the
other limited partners.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Even a cursory review of the decision rendered by Judge
Croft in this case shows that an extraordinary effort was made by
the lower court in deciding the various issues presented in this
complex lawsuit.

The court, after listening to some eleven days

of testimony and reviewing over 350 exhibits, prepared what it
termed a "Memorandum and Summation of Evidence1' of some 178
pages.

This document attempts to summarize in chronological

order the various events which occurred in this lawsuit.

The

court, not counsel, prepared this extensive summary of evidence.
Utilizing this "Memorandum" the court then on its own
initiative and with no assistance of counsel prepared the
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Verdicts" contained
in Appendix II to this Brief. This document consists of 234 pages
and is divided into a "Findings" section, a "Conclusions of Law"
section and a "Verdict" section.

Appellant Sampson appreciates

the conscientious effort that Judge Croft made in this case and
certainly does not complain that the case was not thoroughly

analyzed or considered by the lower court.
As noted earlier, Appellants1 counsel has extensively
reviewed both the record containing the transcript evidence and
documentary evidence with the various factual probative findings
entered by the lower court. With only few exceptions, Appellant
does not contest the probative findings of the lower court and
t h e r e fore has not: r e 1 ied upon the under 1 ying record in this case
to make the various legal arguments which will follow.

Sampson

concedes that the events chronicalled by the lower court did in
fact occur and his only concern is focused upon the ultimate
facts found by the lower court based upon these probative facts
and upon conclusions of law based upon the factual findings.
The voluminous nature of this decision creates a difficult
problem for appellant Sampson.

It is, for example, easy to

become lost and confused in the maze of pages written by the
lower court and to digress from the essential issues now being
raised by Appellant.

It :i s a] so difficult to reconcile all of

the portions of the Findings in that the sheer number of findings
create repetition and improper classification of facts as
conclusions of law and conclusions of law as facts.

Hopefully,

Appellant will be able to sufficiently direct this Court's
attention to those limited problems surrounding the judge's
opinion in order to eliminate a fruitless journey into
unnecessary issues and resolutions.
Before proceeding into the legal arguments concerning this
appeal it is well to summarize the various standards of review
which apply to the issues now raised by appellant Sampson.

First, Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure simply
states, "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A.

.

.

." The lower court

complied with this rule in the preparation of the "Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Verdicts" contained as Appendix
II to this Brief.
The secondary document entitled "Memorandum and Summation of
Evidence" does not comply with this rule since it was intended by
the lower court as a document to assist it in compiling the
massive evidence presented at trial.

For this reason, therefore,

Appellant has not utilized the"Memorandum" in the preparation of
this Brief even though the chronology of events listed therein
are generally accurate and sequential.

However, much of the

information contained in the Memorandum is extraneous and does
not relate to the specific Findings and Conclusions ultimately
entered by the court as contained in Appendix II.

For this

reason, therefore, Appellant maintains that review must be
limited solely to the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment in order
to comply with Rule 52 and the normal rules of judicial review.
Second, in this appeal a number of separate errors are being
asserted relating to the relationship of findings and conclusions
of law.

These principles of review are stated as follows.

The Findings of Fact must provide a basis for determining
whether there is a rational basis for the award of damages.
Proper findings are essential to enable this Court to perform its
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f unc? J •-*-• of assuring that the findings support the judgment and
that the evidence supports the findings.

Romrell v. Zions

Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980); Chandler v. West, 610 P . 2d
1299 (Utah 1980) .
Next, an appellate court does not accord any deference to
c o n c 1 u s i o n s i> f ] a w • : f t h e t r i a 1 e o u r t s i 11 i n g w i t h o u t a jury i n
reviewing such conclusions of law for correctness,

This Court is

as capable of determining a question of law as is the trial court
and therefore is not bound by its conclusions.

Wessel v.

Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985);
Automotive Mfrs. Warehouse, Inc.

v. Service Auto Parts,

Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979).

If a conclusion by the trial

court conflicts with, or does not follow, a finding of fact made
by the trial court, the appellate court will apply the proper
conclusion of law.

City of Raton v. Vermego Conservancy

District, 678 P.2d 1170 (N.M, 1984).
When findings of fact by a trial court are either so
inconsistent or so confusing, vague or indefinite that an
appellate court cannot determine the facts that the trial court
intended to find, such findings are insufficient to support the
judgment.

Hawkins v. Teeples and Thatcher, Inc., 515 P 2d

927 (Ore. 1973) .
Findings of fact that are conclusions of law are treated as
such on appea 1 and w:i ] ] stand on 1 y :i f there are other findings of
fact sufficient to support them.
Washington, Inc.

Town Concrete Pipe of

v. Redford, 717 P.2d 1384 (Wash.

Thompson-Hayward Chemical Co.

App. 1986);

v. Cyprus Mines Corp., 660

P.2d 973 (Kan* App. 1983),

The appellate court is free to review

without deference to the lower court findings that combine both
facts and law when there is error as to the law.

Abrams v.

Horizon Corp., 669 P.2d 90 (Ariz. App. 1982).
An appellate court must give great weight to the findings
made and the inferences drawn by the trial judge but it must
reject his findings if it considers them to be clearly erroneous.
A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.

It may regard a finding as clearly erroneous only if

the finding is without adequate evidentiary support or is induced
by an erroneous view of the law.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d

191 (Utah 1987); Adair v. Bracken, 70 Utah Adv.

Rep.

39 (Ct.

App. 11-24-87) .
The failure of the trial court to make findings on all
material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the
record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only
a finding in favor of the judgment.

In addition, the findings

must indicate that the court's judgment or decree follows
logically from, and is supported by the evidence.

Also, the

findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue is reached.

Epstein v.

Epstein, 741 P.2d 974 (Utah App. 1987).
Finally, findings of probative facts can be used to overcome
an express finding of the ultimate fact as where it clearly

appears that the ultimate fact is found on] y as a conclusion from
the particular probative facts found or the probative facts found
are such as necessarily overcomes the finding of the ultimate
fact.

89 C,J,S,, "Trial", §636, p, 470,

With these principles in mind it now remains to examine the
issues raised by Appellant in this appeal.
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING SAMPSON HAD INTENTIONALLY
INTERFERRED WITH THE BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS OF
DEFENDANTS.
The trial court found liability against Sampson in this case
based upon Plaintiff's Fourth Claim of Relief seeking damages for
intentional interference of contractual and prospective
relationships.

The court recognized this theory of liability as

enunciated :i n thi s Court! s decision of Leigh Furniture &
Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).

The court entered

mixed findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the
elements of this tort.

See, Findings, pp.

Conclusions, pp. 188-193.

93-116 and

In finding liability the court

concluded that Sampson had (1) an improper motive in his
relationship with the limited farm partnerships; (2) that he used
improper means in implementing his control and (3) that these
actions caused injury to the defendants.

In addition, the court

rejected Sampson's claim of the affirmative defense of waiver on
the part of defendants.

Each of these conclusions will now be

examined in seriatim.
A,

Sampson Neither Had an Improper Purpose
Nor Used an Improper Means When He Assisted
the Various Farm Limited Partnerships Which
Had Been Created by Defendants Nor Did He

Legally Cause Injury to Defendants.
1.

There was No Factual Finding Sufficient to Justify

the Conclusion that Sampson had an Improper Purpose in His
Dealings With the Limited Partnerships.
In Leigh Furniture this Court held that the tort of
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage may
be shown by proving an improper purpose or motive, intent or
objective,

"Because it requires that the improper purpose

predominate, this alternative takes the long view of the
defendant's conduct, allowing objectionable short run purposes to
be eclipsed by legitimate long-range economic motivation." 567
P.2d at 307.
In Leigh Furniture and Carpet this Court noted that
even when a defendant has ill will toward a plaintiff an improper
motive will not be found if there is a proper purpose in the
conduct.

Essentially, conduct must be directed solely to the

satisfaction of spite or ill will and not at all to the
advancement of his competitive interest over the person harmed if
an improper purpose is to be found.

This Court observed:

Problems inherent in proving motivation or purpose
make it prudent for commercial conduct to be regulated
for the most part by the improper means alternative
which typically requires only a showing of particular
conduct. Id. at 307.
In the Leigh Furniture case this Court found even
though the plaintiff had deliberately injured the defendants1
economic relations that thei njury was not an end in itself.
Instead it was an intermediate step toward achieving a long-range
financial goal of profitability by reselling the building free of
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the defendant's interest.

This Court concluded that "because

that economic interest seems to have been controlling, we must
conclude that the evidence in this case would not support a jury
finding that the corporation's predominate purpose was to injure
or ruin Isom's business merely for the sake of injury alone."
Id. at 308.
i its factual findings the court states the following:
Sampson suggested from time to time that his sole
objective was to salvage the partnerships' assets for
the limited partners to the point of ai least getting
back their investments. The evidence does not show
that all investors joined in retaining Sampson as their
attorney or their proxy, but the evidence does make
clear that Sampson's main goal and effort soon became
one of getting rid of Richins from all partnerships and
obtaining control thereof for himself and his clients
whom he never fully specifically identified. I think
the evidence shows, and so find, that his self-declared
benevolent motive soon changed to one of greed and a
vendetta to oust Richins and take complete control.
(Findings, j 115).
Thr* court =ilso makes the st itement that Sampson interferred
with the limited partnerships with a desire to do harm to
defendants for his own sake, a mere officious intermeddling for
n< jther reason than a desire to interfere and such a showing of
facts as to establish by a preponderance of the evidence to a
substantial degree that the improper purposes predominated any
other purpose.

Id.

The court entered a conclusion of law

essentially to the effect that the evidence preponderates in
showing that Sampson : retentional Ly inteferred wiMi the relations
of Defendants for an improper purpose.

(Conclusions, p. 193).

Sampson would submit that these "Findings" by the lower
court die really conclusions of law and that a review of the
actual probative findings in the case reveals no evidence to

sustain the conclusion.

There is no finding, for example, that

Sampson had any relationship with Richins prior to Sampson being
contacted by several limited partners concerning their
investments.

The lower court noted that Milton Goff and Rex

Kohler sought Sampson's legal advice and that "their concerns
were real and based upon the problem facts and circumstances then
confronting Richins and his companies for which Richins, not
Sampson, was responsible." (Findings, p. 98).
The court also found that almost immediately upon attending
the first meeting of limited partnerships that the limited
partners asked Sampson to be legal counsel for them and requested
him to take necessary steps to relieve Richtron as general
partner and to liquidate in an orderly manner.
64).

(Findings, p.

Later, Richins agreed that Sampson should hold the

partnership funds since the limited partners did not trust
Richins and therefore would not pay him directly.

(Findings, p.

68) .
It is also undisputed that in May of 1980 when Sampson first
was contacted by his clients that the partnerships were in dire
straits financially and that a number of events seriously
jeopardized their continuing existence.

(Findings, pp. 54-64).

In May of 1980 RFC upon the suggestion of Sampson and the other
limited partners filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

(Findings, p.

134) .
It is also undisputed that during the majority of 1980
Sampson and Richins attempted to settle the interests of Richins1
companies and that in fact a compromise agreement had been made
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and was sent to all of the limited partners for approval.
(Findings, pp. 68-69).

This entire lawsuit would have been

avoided had all of the limited partners agreed to the terms of
the settlement.
Thus, the conclusion of the trial court is not supported by
its own factual findings.

There is no question but that the

limited parters being represented by Sampson had important
financial interests at stake in view of the serious problems that
had been created by Richins' "mismanagement11.
57-64).

(Findings, pp.

These limited partners had a justifiable motive in

protecting their financial interests.

See, Serafino v.

Palm Terrace Apts., Inc., 343 S.2d 851 (Fla. App. 1976);
Restatement of Torts 2d, §769 ("The rule stated in this Section
applies for the purpose of protecting the actor's interest.

If

his conduct is directed to that end, it is immaterial that he
also takes a malicious delight in the harm caused by his
action.").
During this entire period of time when Sampson first entered
the scene in 1980 up until 1984 Sampson maintained limited
partnership clients who depended upon him for both legal advice
and financial advice.

Had Sampson merely advised all of the

limited partners who had retained him to terminate their
relationship with the defendants1 corporation, then there clearly
could have been no finding of evil purpose.

An attorney acting

within the scope of his employment or a business advisor is
privileged to give advice without fear of a tortious suit.
Parker v. Gordon, 442 S.2d 273 (Fla.

App.

1984); Los

Angeles Airways, Inc.

v. Davis, 687 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1982);

Welch v. Bancorp Management Advisors, Inc., 675 P.2d 172
(Ore. 1982) . This privilege or absence of evil motive exists
even if the attorney or financial advisor receives a financial
gain himself.

Los Angeles Airways, Inc., supra; Lichtie

v. U.S. Home Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Utah 1987).
Even the court's own conclusion does not allow the finding
of an improper motive.

The fact, for example, that "Sampson's

main goal and effort soon became one of getting rid of Richins
from all partnerships and obtaining control thereof for himself
and his clients" does not state an improper motive if Sampson and
his clients believed that Richins was detrimental to the
financial stability of the limited partnership farm operations.
In conclusion, therefore, applying the standards adopted by
this Court in the Leigh Furniture case the lower court erred
in concluding an improper motive on Sampson's part when there was
no factual findings nor evidence to justify this conclusion.
2.

The Lower Court Erred in Concluding that Sampson

Utilized Improper Means During His Relationship With the Limited
Partnerships.
The court listed a number of acts which it believed
constituted improper means as defined in the Leigh Furniture
case.

These included: (1) erroneous advice by Sampson that the

markup charged by the defendants was a breach of a fiduciary duty
owed to the partnership (Findings, p. 101); (2) Sampson's
erroneous advice that the advances made by the general partners
would not have to be repaid by the partnership (Findings, pp.

103-105); (3) Sampson's acts of collecting money on behalf of the
partnership (Findings, p. 105); (4) refusal of Sampson to deliver
documents of foreclosure to Richins after requested (Findings, p.
106); (5) wrongfully utilizing a power of attorney to substitute
general partners (Findings, p. 107); (6) failing to properly
amend the limited partnership certificates (Findings, p. 109);
(7) obtaining an assignment of the Osborn judgment in violation
of §78-51-27 (Findings, p. 109); (8) Sampson substituting his
clients as plaintiffs in the Osborn case in violation of
§78-51-27 (Findings, p. 110); and (9) making use of facts
obtained while involved as an attorney-client in violation of
ethical standards (Findings, p. 116).
The legal conclusion of improper means is erroneous for two
reasons: first, these acts alone or in combination are not the
type of acts prohibited under the "improper means" standard.
Second, the lower court failed to apply a "good faith" standard
in determining the conduct of Sampson.
As to this first contention this Court in Leigh
Furniture stated that improper means is shown where the means
used to interfere with a party's economic relations are contrary
to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations or recognized
common law rules.

This Court stated, "Such acts are illegal or

tortious in themselves and hence are clearly 'improper' means of
interference.

Examples used to illustrate this principle were

secondary boycott, price fixing, violence, threats or other
intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded
litigation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood." Id. at 308.

The Restatement of Torts requires the means used to be "innately
wrongful, or predatory in character." Restatement of Torts 2d,
§766A, Comment e, p. 19 (1979).
Appellant submits that the listed items by the lower court
do not fit this category of "improper means" since they involve
conduct which is not itself predatory or tortious and generally
involve errors in judgment or technical legal violations.
Second, the lower court failed to consider Sampson's good
faith efforts in undertaking a majority of the actions which the
lower court listed.

For example, the court noted that Sampson in

giving legal advice as to the markup and the advances believed
that he was giving the right legal opinion but stated that his
belief did not make it so and therefore was a factor to be
considered in determining tort liability.

(Conclusions, pp.

172-73).
Likewise, the court found that Sampson honestly believed
that the powers of attorney authorized him to exercise the vote
of each partner that signed the power and returned it to him
thereby authorizing him by majority vote to remove the general
partners and substitute his own PC.

"What Sampson did he, in my

opinion, did believing in the validity of his own stand."
(Findings, p. 80). Likewise, "there was no direct proof that
Sampson was aware of the provisions of §78-51-27, which rendered
his acquisition of the Osborn judgment, as a lawyer, a serious
violation of law."

Id.

Likewise, the court found that at all times Sampson believed
because of one circumstance or another that he had authority to

operate as the general partner on behalf of the limited
partnerships.

The court stated:

For almost six months he worked amicably with
Richins on settlement. When that failed, by powers of
attorney he got proxies to vote the limited partners'
interest- He did so, alleging his PC a general
partner. When that was said to be contrary to law, he
voted AG Management in as the general partner and so
operated. By the time Judge Palmer ruled that illegal,
Sampson was able to carry on under a color of authority
by receipt of an IRS certificate of sale, followed by
two favorable rulings by Judge Cornaby until the IRS
sale was voided in May of 1984 by a federal court
order. (Conclusions, p. 143).
In Hill v. Kansas City Star Co., 719 S.W.2d 808 (Mo.
App. 1986) a suit was brought against a newspaper for allegedly
tortiously interfering with the contract or a newspaper vendor.
The newspaper terminated a contract on the basis of a report that
the vendor had been vandalizing vending machines of the
newspaper.

The court in ruling in favor of the newspaper held

that the question was not whether or not the vendor had committed
the vandalism but whether the newspaper had acted in good faith
in believing the report that such vandalism occurred.

Whether

the report was mistaken or not was irrelevant.
Similarly, in Hennum v. City of Medina, 402 N.W.2d 327 (N.D.
1987) the appellate court reversed the lower court and held that
whether a mayor acted in good faith as to information he had
about an employee was relevant in determining whether a
termination was improper under a suit for tortious interference.
In GM Ambulance v. Canyon State Ambulance, 739 P.2d 203
(Ariz. App. 1987) an ambulance company brought suit to enjoin a
competitor from operating in its territory.

The court stated

that the ambulance competitor had violated a statute prohibiting

such competition.

The court referred to this Court's decision in

Leigh Furniture and noted that improper conduct gives rise
to liability.

The court stated, however:

We believe, however, that Canyon State's violation
of the statute is outweighed by the good faith reliance
on the letter. Canyon State relied on the opinion of
the very department charged with regulating its
conduct. Under such circumstances we do not believe
that it acted improperly so as to subject itself to
liability for the tort of interference with contract.
Id. at 205.
In Institutional Food v. Golden State Strawberries, 537
F. Supp. 1105 (D. Mo. 1983) the court noted that it is not
necessarily whether a particular fact exists or does not exist at
the time an interference allegedly occurrs.

Instead, it is the

good faith belief of the party at the time in taking its course
of action.

To find liability there must be a showing that the

defendant acted maliciously, in bad faith, without any reasonable
basis for believing in the merit of its claim justifying its
course of action.
Finally, in American Petrofina, Inc.

v. PPG Industries,

Inc., 679 S.W.2d 740 (App. Tex. 1984) the court ruled that the
defendant had improperly interpreted a contract upon which it
based its alleged interference.

The court in finding no

liability stated:
There is no evidence that Fina acted under
anything other than a good faith belief that it was not
required to deliver oil which had trippled in value
over four years of inactivity in a transaction which
contemplated frequent purchases and use of the oil at
the prevailing rates. Although the trial court found,
and this court concurs, that the two contracts are to
be construed together, we cannot say that Fina could
not have had the conviction that it was bound only by
the provisions of its contract with its distributor.
. . Complete innocence and perfect good faith might
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very well be the basis of the justification which
constitutes a defense to a claim for tortious
interference with a contract. Id. at 758-59.
Here, the court in its Findings relied upon the Leigh
decision in which this Court stated:
Even in small groups, these acts might be
explained as merely instances of aggressive or
abrasive—though not illegal or tortious—tactics,
excesses that occur in contractual and commercial
relationships. But in total and in cumulative effect,
as a course of action extending over a period of three
and one half years and culminating in the failure of
Isom's business, the Leigh Corporation's acts crossed
the threshhold beyond what is incidental and
justifiable to what is tortious. 657 P.2d at 306.
See the Court's reference to "crossing the threshhold" at pp.
94 and 114 of Findings.
Since the lower court obviously applied the strict letter of
the law to the acts of Sampson and failed to consider any element
of good faith it is impossible to say whether these series of
events relied upon by the lower court to find an improper means
would have been sufficient had a majority of them been
negated by Sampsonfs conceded good faith belief.

In other words,

if a person believes he is complying with the laws of limited
partnership, believes that he is interpreting a limited
partnership agreement correctly, and believes that he has legal
authority to act as a general partner then such actions are not
"illegal means" under the Leigh Furniture case even though
it is later determined that these actions are all legally
invalid because of various legal interpretations made by
subsequent court decisions.
For these reasons, therefore, the Findings of the lower
court did not justify the conclusion of improper means in that
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the listed acts did not rise to the level required of predatory
acts and second, the lower court incorrectly failed to apply a
good faith standard in determining these acts.
3•

The Lower Court Erred in Concluding that the Actions

of Sampson Caused Injury to the Defendants.
In order to recover damages for an intentional interference
with prospective economic relations it is required that the
plaintiff prove that the defendant caused injury to the
plaintiff.

657 P.2d at 304.

The court entered a finding that

"Sampson by his tortious conduct caused injury to the
defendants." The court noted that it does not appear that Richins
"ever gained actual control over any of the partnerships after
[the end of 1980] even though he successfully reversed Sampsonfs
tactics in state and federal courts."

(Findings, pp. 116-17).

The court also entered a conclusion of law that based upon the
summary of facts as contained in Findings 96 and 97 that Sampson
caused injury to the defendants.

(Conclusions, p. 193).

This finding of injury is inconsistent with other findings
of the court which negate such causation.

First, the court

correctly noted that the limited partnership agreement in this
case could be terminated by either the limited partners or the
general partners at will.

(Conclusions, p. 209).

Next, the court in a series of findings observed the
financial instability of the limited partnerships at the time
Sampson first became involved.

The court noted that as of May

1980 the evidence suggested a bleak outlook for the future of the
limited partnership operations.

-/in-

(Findings, p. 54). The court

stated, "As stated in prior findings, by May, 1980, Richins and
his companies had become confronted with substantial financial
problems, as well as others likewise mentioned elsewhere, which
were of such magnitude that success in overcoming them seemed
doubtful."

(Findings, p. 97).

In another finding the court stated, "There is in fact, no
assurance, even disregarding the problems defendants and the
partnerships were confronted with in May, 1980, that in the end
after final sale of the properties that there would be profits
remaining to be so divided."

(Findings, p. 134).

In a conclusion the court stated:
If adjusted for prior payments made by the
partnerships to RFC, it would probably reflect a total
markup which amount could be used as a measure of
damages only if defendants could prove that but for
Sampson's conduct, all partnership contracts would have
been paid off in full. This they have not done and
could not have done. (Conclusions, p. 197).
In another area the court stated:
Even if a true value of RFC's equity in each
partnership property under its resale contract could be
established, circumstances existing in May 1980,
created a strong probability that some, if not all, of
such contracts would never be paid out. (Verdict,
p. 224).
Finally, in the conclusion of the Verdict section the court
says:
Even if Sampson had never appeared on the scene,
it does not appear probable that Richins and RFC would
have prevented foreclosure of the original purchase
contracts, based upon the existing facts and
circumstances. (Verdict, pp. 230-31).
These inconsistent findings will now be analyzed in terms of
case law.

An interest in a contract terminable at will is

primarily an interest in future relations between the parties

since the parties have no legal assurance of the continuing
relationship.
1984).

Kelly v. St. Vincent Hospital, 692 P.2d 1350 (N.M.

A contract which is "at will" gives either party the

absolute right to withdraw from the obligation at any time.
Levin v. Cuhn Loeb & Co., 417 A.2d 79 (N.J.

1980).

Thus, under the terms of all of these limited partnership
farm agreements the limited partners were free at any time to
terminate their relations with the defendants or some of the
defendants by either dissolving the partnership altogether or by
electing a new general partner to take the defendants' place.
There was no "right" for the defendants to continue their control
over the limited partnerships in the future.
The Missouri Court of Appeals in Tri-Continental Leasing
Co. v. Neidhardt, 540 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. App. 1976) stated the
correct rule for analysis as to causation in tortious
interference cases.

The court stated that "to establish

liability in a tortious interference with contract case, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant's acts caused the breach."
The court then stated:
In determining whether the defendant's acts were a
"moving cause" in the breach, courts apply what is
essentially a "but for" test of causation.
(Citations
omitted). The rule presupposes that the party
defaulting was ready, able and willing to perform and
would have done so if it had not been prevented or
persuaded by the malicious and unwarranted interference
of a third party. Id. at 216.
The court observed that a plaintiff must show that a defendant
actively and affirmatively took steps to induce a breach but that
this factor alone is not sufficient to establish liability.
"There must be an additional showing that the defendant's
-42-

affirmative conduct caused the breach—that had it not been for
the defendant's acts, the contract would have been
performed." Id. at 216.
The court in that case found that there was no evidence,
direct or circumstantial that would permit the jury to find
without resort to speculation or conjecture that the third party
would have performed the contract "but for" the actions of the
defendant.

Because a jury cannot resort to such speculation and

conjecture, the appellate court affirmed a motion for directed
verdict granted by the lower court overturning a jury verdict in
favor of the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico made a similar decision.
Anderson v. Dairyland Ins.

Co., 637 P.2d 837 (N.M.

1981) the

court stated:
It is a basic rule that the defendant must be
shown to have caused the interference. We cannot
uphold a claim for interference with prospective
contractual relations where it is not clear that the
plaintiff himself has not caused the interference.
Where the claim is based on an indirect interference
such as that alleged here, the plaintiff must clearly
show that his own action or inaction did not constitute
interference. In other words, Anderson must prove that
there was an actual prospective contractual relation
which, but for the insurer's interference, would have
been consummated. This Anderson has failed to show.
Id. at 841.
In Levin v. Cuhn Loeb & Co., 417 A.2d 79, 85 (N.J.
Super. 1980) the court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of
the defendant when it found that viewing the evidence most
favorably to the plaintiff there was no showing that the
plaintiff would have continued his contractual relation but for
the conduct of the defendant.

The court cited authority which

In

stated "there must be some certainty that the plaintiff would
have gotten the contract but for the fraud.
to surmise or speculation." Id.

This cannot be left

See also, Special

Event Entertainment v. Rockefeller Center, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 72
(D.N.Y. 1978).

("The pleadings themselves reveal that the Radio

City defendants were not disposed toward honoring their alleged
commitment even before the state defendants entered the
negotiations.").
The Findings of the Court show that the limited partners
were already fleeing a sinking ship before Sampson entered the
picture.

The partnerships were in foreclosure proceedings, the

IRS had attached defendants1 assets for failure to pay taxes and
RFC was in bankruptcy.

To conclude that the limited partners

would have remained with defendants "but for" Sampson's
interference is pure speculation and against the weight of the
court's own factual findings.

B.

The Lower Court Erred in Concluding That
The Affirmative Defenses of Waiver and Estoppel
Were Not Applicable to the Defendants in This
Case.

The court specifically found that there were not sufficient
facts to establish either estoppel or waiver as against the
defendants.

(Findings, pp. 145-50).

The court also entered the

following Conclusion:
As to the affirmative defenses of estoppel, waiver
and laches, it is my opinion that Sampson did not prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that Richins1
actions at any time induced Sampson to believe certain
facts existed that lead to Sampson's detriment; or by
his actions evince in any unequivocable manner an
intent to waive his control over the partnerships and
-44-

step aside in favor of Sampson; nor did Richins'
actions at any time constitute a lack of diligence
which brought injury to Sampson; and I so conclude.
(Conclusions, p. 205).
Sampson submits that this legal conclusion is not supported
by the factual findings of the court.

The court found, for

example, that as early as June 9, 1980 Sampson told the members
of the Blackfoot Limited Partnership that he was withdrawing as
general partner and told them to find a more compatible one.

On

June 10 he filed a formal notice withdrawing and on June 11 he
wrote three other similar letters withdrawing.

(Findings, pp.

67-68).
On June 2 and June 5, Richins without advising any investor
or partnership, executed quit claim deeds purporting to convey
all of the partnership properties from the limited partnerships
to RFC.

(Findings, p.

65). The deeds were recorded in December

1980 and January 1981.
On November 13 Richins executed a notice of withdrawal of
the general partner to six other limited partnerships.

By

January 6, 1981 he had sent identical notices to eighteen other
partnerships.

(Findings, p. 69). While stating that the

partnerships would be wound up immediately Richins undertook no
effort to wind up the partnerships after notice was given.
(Findings, p. 64).
In a conclusion of law the court stated:
The Richtron.general partners, even after
withdrawal, had the duty and obligation under the law
to wind up the partnership affairs and terminate the
partnership, when there had been no valid exercise of
the partners' right to remove by majority vote the
general partner and elect a new one. Richins
continuously challenged the validity of Sampson's
-45-

actions with respect to installing a new general
partner, yet delayed in seeking help from the court to
rule on his challenge when prompt action seemed
indicated. (Conclusions, p. 204).
In the Verdict portion of the opinion the court made this
finding:
Finally, and of great importance, was Richins1
failure to himself undertake efforts to wind up
partnership affairs and bring about dissolution and
termination with any resulting benefits to all
concerned. The courts were there to help him to do so
but he never used them for that purpose. I recall that
in the Blackstone suit against defendants, they
counterclaimed seeking dissolution; but when Judge
Palmer ruled in their favor that AG Management was not
legally elected general partner, any further effort in
that case on their counterclaim was not brought out in
this trial. Even in the case at bar, Richins did not
seek a windup and dissolution by this Court. (Verdict,
p. 229).
Finally, the court observed in its findings that after
Sampson had obtained the power of attorneys and remained in
control of the limited partnerships Richins did nothing for two
years before obtaining a summary judgment that the transfer was
invalid.

In addition, Richins after obtaining the invalidation

of the IRS sale in May of 1984 waited until January 5, 1985
before requesting Judge Cornaby to vacate the prior orders.
(Findings, pp. 140-41).
It requires no legal citation that the principles of waiver
and estoppel should be applied in this case.

Essentially,

Richins voluntarily withdrew as general partner in all of the
limited partnerships.

It is hard to imagine what act could be

considered more of a waiver of rights to continue as the general
partner than the notices of withdrawal.

In addition, Richins did

nothing to wind up the affairs of the corporation or to seek
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court relief in obtaining orders allowing a winding up.

Sampson

and the limited partners were essentially left on a course of
their own with all of the Richins financial problems still on
board the sinking partnership vessel.

Finally, Richins allowed

this conduct to continue for over two years before finally
obtaining a court order invalidating Sampson's authority.
The lower court should have found in favor of Sampson as to
these defenses which under the terms of tortious interference
would have negated any improper purpose or improper means which
the court attributed to Sampson.
In conclusion, therefore, the lower court erred in finding
an improper purpose, an improper means, in finding causation of
injury, and in not finding in favor of the affirmative defenses.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF DAMAGES
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS.
The question as to damages only becomes relevant to this
appeal if this Court rejects the previous contentions of
Appellant relating to the finding of liability.

As an alternate

grounds for appeal, therefore, Sampson maintains that the lower
court erred in its award of damages to the defendants.
Specifically, the court erred in awarding $250,000 in favor of
Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General against Sampson as
consequential damages and an award in favor of RFC against
Sampson for $30,974.50 and Richtron against Sampson for $4,222.50
which represents their equity amounts as limited partners.
of these objections will now be discussed.
A.

The Factual Findings of the Lower Court Do Not
-/IT —

Both

Justify the Imposition of $250,000 as Consequential
Damages .
As noted earlier, it is essential that a trial court enter
adequate findings as to damages in order to justify the decision
and to allow appellate review.

In the instant case the lower

court failed to adhere to this requirement.

It is submitted that

anyone reading the 234 page opinion of Judge Croft would believe
that no substantial damages had been awarded to the defendants
against Sampson until the very last page of the opinion is read.
In other words, the $250,000 figure appears like a phantom in the
night.

There is no previous reference to this amount in either

the Findings, Conclusions, or Verdict.
This inadequacy was stated to the judge during oral
argument on motions to amend the findings.

Sampson's trial

counsel made the following statement to the lower court:
In Objection No. 5, Your Honor, the court in
finding 232 acknowledges that there are damages of a
consequential nature and then, however, the Court does
not go on with any to identify what damages the Court
is referring what evidence supports that particular
statement, then the Court goes on and awards the
$250,000 in favor of the general partners and against
Mr. Sampson. As we have outlined here on page 5, I
think the Court walked through all the various
theories, and then the Court dispelled most of these
theories, and I guess our position is we don't have any
idea, Your Honor, where the $250,000 comes from.
(Transcript Hearing of September 11, 1987, p. 26).
The statement by Sampson's attorney is correct.

An

examination of the opinion of Judge Croft essentially rejects
every damage contention of the defendants with minor exceptions.
The court found that as to the attorney-client fiduciary breach
there was evidence of liability but no damages had been proven.
(Findings, pp.

44-51; Conclusions, p.
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165). As to the Count II

claim of negligent handling of lawsuits the court awarded Richins
as an individual $2,027.40 for the cost incurred in setting aside
a default judgment.
165-66).

(Findings, pp.

52-53; Conclusions, pp.

The only other awards of damages was $30,974.50 to RFC

for its interest in the Catlow Valley and Richfield Limited
Partnerships and $4,222.50 to Richtron for its limited
partnership interest in the Pleasant Valley Partnership.

Both of

these awards will be discussed in the following section.
Thus, as to the Fourth Claim relating to tortious
interference no award was made with the exception of the $250,000
to Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General and $100 to RFC. Richins'
individual claims were denied on the basis he did not prove any
interference with his own personal right to earn a livelihood.
(Findings, p.

90). As to RFC the court concluded that its only

claim to damages was as the seller of the farm properties to the
various limited partnerships.

The court reasoned that even if

Sampson had never appeared on the scene it was not probable that
RFC could have prevented foreclosure of the original purchase
contracts based upon the existing facts and circumstances
disclosed by the evidence.

(Verdict, pp.

228-30).

This was

especially true since FRC was in bankruptcy at the time Sampson
first came into the partnership affairs.

(Verdict, p. 226).

The court awarded $100.00 as nominal damages.
As to the two general partners the court specifically
rejected each of the requested items of damages.

First, it

rejected the defendants' claim for repayment of advances made to
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the limited partnership on the basis that there was no
preponderance of evidence to show that but for Sampson's efforts
the partnerships would have in fact been solvent to pay the
advances made by the general partners at the termination of the
partnerships,

(Findings, p. 105; Conclusions, pp. 215-16).

As

to the general partners1 claim for a ten percent of profits from
the limited partnerships the court concluded that the evidentiary
record in the case was purely speculative as to whether any
profits would be in existence at the time of termination and
therefore no damages could be awarded.

(Findings, p. 133;

Conclusions, pp. 198, 204).
The court reviewed the various pieces of evidence offered by
the defendants to show loss of equity positions or profits.
(Findings, pp. 124-37).

The court entered Conclusions of Law

that any attempt to prove profits or equity was too speculative
and that the evidence offered by the defendants was not credible.
(Conclusions, pp. 198-205).

Finally, in the "Verdict" portion of

the opinion the court once again went through its reasoning as to
all of the defendants and all of the claims.

(Verdict, pp.

209-32).
The court noted, for example, that by May of 1980 Richins
had so mismanaged the partnership affairs that they did not have
funds to pay installments owed RFC so that RFC could not pay its
installment obligations to the contract sellers.
229).

(Verdict, p.

The court stated that it was the problems created by

Richins1 mismanagement followed by Sampson's tortious conduct
that brought this case to court for a decision as to whether any
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damages were recoverable upon the counterclaim.

The court stated

that even though the partnerships were floundering Sampson sought
value and spent six years in running it leaving Richins with no
tangible asset or value,

(Verdict, p. 231),

The only explanation for the $250,000 judgment has to be
contained on Page 232, two pages before the decision ends.

The

court said:
As stated before, damages are in tort, not in
contract, rendering liability for damages for either
the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or
consequential for which the tortious interference is
the legal cause. I think as to some claim for relief
damages, of at least a consequential nature, have been
shown with a reasonable degree of certainty by a
preponderance of the evidence. (Verdict, p. 232).
The only other indication giving any enlightenment as to the
composition of the $250,000 figure is seen in the court's oral
colloquy with Sampson's trial counsel during the hearing to amend
the findings.

A copy of this portion of the transcript is

contained in Appendix I of this Brief.

The lower court basically

took the position that the $250,000 figure was analogous to a
jury bringing in a $25,000 figure in a $100,000 suit.
26).

(Tr. p.

The court stated that he was not obligated to say what the

$250,000 is made up of.

(Tr. p. 31). The court stated that

"recovery wasn't based upon contract relationships.

It was a

tort just like you run a red light and crash into your car.
commit a tort and you're injured.
recover damages.

But how much?

You wanted $100,000.

I

And you are entitled to
Well, the jury says $25,000.

You get $25,000, you see."

(Tr. p. 28).

The court concluded by saying that in no sense of the word
could he give Richins $5 million, $6 million, $9 million, or $12
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million as he requested because the evidence wasn't there.
$250,000 is just the amount the court came up with.

The

He is not,

according to the court, required to break it down into advances
not recovered, improper expenditure of attorneys' fees by Sampson
or overhead expenses.

(Tr. p. 31).

A brief review of case law concerning damages will support
Sampson's contention that the award of $250,000 without any
evidentiary basis was error.

In Robinson v. Herinson, 409

P.2d 121 (Utah 1965) this Court stated the rule that no award of
damages should be based upon mere speculation or conjecture.
There must be firm foundation for any award of damages by proof
that is at least more probable than not that damages have been
suffered.

See also, Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bread

Co., 504 P.2d 40 (Utah 1972).
More recently, this Court stated:
It is true that some degree of uncertainty in the
evidence of damages will not relieve a defendant from
recompensing a wronged plaintiff. However, it is also
a general rule of long standing that a plaintiff must
show damages by evidence of fact and not by mere
conclusion, and that the items of damage must be
established by substantial evidence and not by
conjecture. And, whether general or special, damages
must be traceable to the wrongs complained of.
Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pacific Railway Co.,
683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984).
By its very definition"consequential" damages must be
analogous to special damages.

This Court noted the distinction

between general and special damages by stating:
General damages are those which naturally and
necessarily result from the harm done. They are
damages which everybody knows are likely to result from
the harm described and so are said to be implied in
law.
Special damages are those which occur as a
natural consequence of the harm done but are not
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so certain to flow therefrom as to be implied in law.
One claiming them must plead them so as to let his
adversary know what will be involved. (Emphasis
added). Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306,
307 (Utah 1975). (Emphasis added).
The court in describing these distinctions used the
following illustration:
Plaintiff sues defendant for blowing up his dam
in the river and claimed damages in the amount of
$5,000. His proof shows the cost of repairs to the dam
to be $1,000. He offers evidence to the effect that he
had a water mill which had to be shut down for two
months during the rebuilding of the dam and that he
lost profits in the amount of $4,000 as a result
thereof. The rebuilding of the dam is an item of
general damages, but the loss of profits due to
inoperation of the mill is an item of special damage
because it is peculiar to his case.
Another man might have his dam blown up and might
not even own a mill, or it might not be operative.
Still another man might have special damages because he
could not irrigate his farm as a result of the
destruction of the dam which he owned and the lowering
of the water below the bottom of his lateral ditch.
Each dam owner would need to set forth his particular
special damages because such special damages do not of
necessity follow as a result of the tort. Id. at
307. See also, Prince v. Peterson, 533 P.2d
1325, 1328 (Utah 1975).
The lower court essentially held that all of the claimed
damage theories of defendant could not be sustained because of
their speculative nature.

He rejected the general partners'

claim for advances, for lost profits, and for management fees.
He then, however, concluded that consequential damages was of the
nature of a general damage and that an amount could be awarded
without any explanation just as if a jury were awarding damages
for pain and suffering to an injured plaintiff.
This reasoning is clearly erroneous since in order to
determine whether a damage is "legally caused" by the actions of

the defendants it is necessary to know both the amount and the
source of claimed injury.

Under §774A of the Restatement of

Torts "consequential losses for which the interference is the
legal cause may be awarded."

Without specific amounts and

sources the "legal cause" could never be reviewed by an appellate
court.
Besides the deficiency in the court's Findings and
Conclusions there is simply no evidence listed by the court that
would in any way constitute consequential damages giving rise to
any award.

The defendants simply did not plead or produce such

evidence since their damage theories were based upon other claims
which were all summarily rejected by the court.
For this reason, therefore, the award of $250,000 damages to
the two general partners should be vacated.
B.

The Lower Court Erred in Awarding Damages
to Richtron, Inc. and to RFC for Their
Respective Limited Partnership Interests In
Several Farm Properties.

The court awarded $30,974.50 in favor of RFC and against the
plaintiff Sampson for its limited partnership interest in
Richfield Farms and Catlow Valley Farms Nos. 2 and 6.

It awarded

Richtron, Inc. $4,222.50 for its limited partnership interest in
the Pleasant Valley Farm.

(Verdict, pp. 233-34) . The reasoning

behind these awards is contained in the court's Verdict where it
said that Sampson "ignored [their] rights as such limited
partners, sent no notices to either, offered no evidence as to
what in fact happened to the interests of the Pleasant Valley,
Richfield and Catlow Valley Limited Partners, and thereby caused
a loss to RFC and Richtron, Inc. in the amount of their

respective capital interest in those partnerships.

(Verdict, p.

230) .
Essentially, the lower court awarded both RFC and Richtron,
Inc. their original capital shares as limited partners in all of
these farm limited partnerships.

This was done with no showing

by the plaintiffs that at the time Sampson took over the
operation of the partnerships that their original capital
contributions had the same value as when they were initially
contributed.

Consider, for example, that the Catlow

Valley Partnership was in foreclosure and that Richins in
May of 1980 stated that an additional $240,000 had to be
raised to save the property.

(Findings, p. 63).

Plaintiffs produced no evidence and the courts made no
findings that the ignoring of the rights or the failure to send
notices to either of them substantially affected their
partnership interests.

In other words, their interests were no

different than any of the other limited partners in the farm
properties and they were entitled to no more than what their
interests were worth at the time of the alleged interference.
Further, it should be noted that the designated general
partner of each of these limited partnerships to which awards
were granted was one of Richins1 corporate entities.

Thus, when

Richins sent out notices of withdrawal as to the general partner
he could have at that point wound up the affairs of these
partnerships properly and distributed their shares at such time.
Instead, he did nothing during the course of the years and
allowed Sampson to continue acting as general partner.

Thus, any

interest in those limited partnerships again was essentially
waived by Richins when he failed to take action to preserve the
capital interests of each entity.

In view of the fact that the

lower court found that all of these farms had been ultimately
foreclosed upon by their owners and that RFC was in bankruptcy it
was unreasonable to award Richtron, Inc. and RFC their entire
initial capital investment when the evidence clearly showed that
such investment had been forfeited, or at least substantially
reduced.
For these reasons, therefore, the award of damages as stated
above should also be vacated.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the lower court should be reversed and
judgment entered on behalf of defendant Sampson.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of December, 1987.

Craig 3\ ' Cook
Attorned for Appellant
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APPENDIX

I

John T. Anderson, Esq., Utah State Bar No. 94
HANSEN & ANDERSON
Attorneys for Defendants
Suite 600, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)532-7520
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
JOHN P. SAMPSON and MILTON R.
GOFF, individually, and as
trustee of Milton R. Goff
Trust, an unincorporated
association,
Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT

v.
PAUL H. RICHINS; RICHTRON
INC., a Utah corporation;
RICHTRON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Utah corporation;
RICHTRON GENERAL, a Utah
corporation, and,
FRONTIER INVESTMENTS,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. 29552

Defendants.
-ooOoo-

The counterclaim of defendants, Richtron, Inc., Richtron General, Richtron
Financial Corporation and Paul H. Richins (collectively,

"Counterplaintiffs"),

came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Court
Judge, between January 27, 1986 and February 11, 1986. Counterplaintiffs were
represented

by

their

Counterdefendants,

counsel,

John P.

John T.

Sampson

Anderson
and

of

Milton R.

Hansen
Goff,

& Anderson.
trustee,

were

represented by their counsel, Christopher L. Burton and Paul M. Harman of Jones,
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough.

The court having heard and considered the

arguments, representations and statements of counsel and the testimony of
witnesses; having read and considered the complete file of pleadings and papers
and exhibits in this case; having made and entered its memorandum and
summation of evidence; having made and entered its original and amended findings
of fact and conclusions of law and verdicts; and good cause appearing therefor,
the court hereby enters judgment on Counterplaintiffs1 counterclaim as follows:
1.

Counterplaintiff, Paul H. Richins, shall be, and he hereby is, granted

judgment against counterdefendant, John Pe Sampson, for the sum of $2,027.40.
2.

Counterdefendant, Milton R. Goff, trustee, shall be, and he hereby

is, granted judgment of no cause of action on Richins' individual claims against
Milton R. Goff, trustee.
3.

Counterplaintiff, Richtron Financial Corporation, shall be, and it

hereby is, granted judgment against counterdefendant, John P. Sampson, in the
sum of $31,074.50.
4.
judgment

Counterplaintiff, Richtron, Inc., shall be, and it hereby is, granted
against

$4 222.50.
5.

counterdefendant,

John P.

Sampson,

n £>**'

n • i i

in

the amount

of

/

Counterplaintiff^ Richtron General, shall be, andA% hereby i|£

granted judgment against counterdefendant, John P. Sampson, in the sum of
$250,000.00.
6.

Counterdefendants, Milton R4 Goff, trustee for Virgil R. Condon,

Paul D. Hubert, O&M Plumbing & Heating Company, Earl V. Gritton, Phillip R.

2

Boyer, Toffe Sawaya and Russell Smuin, shall be, and they herebv are, granted
judgment of no cause of action on all claims***^ ?t*us 0>rU<ZuiMz£++~*^ *
7.

Counter defendant, John P. Sampson, shall be, and he hereby is,

granted judgment of no cause of action against defendants on their claims for
injunctive relief and an accounting.fop the reason that the accounting infoi»maticjrr
pgnvitied by Counterplaintiff; Paul Hi
8.

IUL1UIU>,*L

i>uffiei<iJiU-

Counterplaintiffs shall be, and they hereby are, granted judgment

against counter defendant, John P. Sampson, for costs in the sum of $1,625.80.
9.

Interest shall accrue on the foregoing sums at the rate of 12% per

annum from the date of entry hereof until the date of payment.
DATED this *2f

day of September, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

drM - C^6tr

orable Bryant K. Croft
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
HANSEN & ANDERSON

Bv
John T. Anderson (y^&ft

W-STfajWA

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By

\
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

In re:
Complaint of
PRIVATE REPRIMAND
Paul H. Richins and
Richtron Cnmoanies
against
I

Case No. 4-83-5-0080

John P. Sampson
Respondent
DOB - 10/15/39
Admission - 12/26/68

]

The Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar,
having conducted its investigation into charges of unethical
conduct brought against John P. Sampson by Paul H. Richins and
certain Richtron Companies, and a Screening Panel of the Ethics
and Discipline Committee having met and considered written
submissions and oral presentations of the parties, now renders
its Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation as follows?

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Beginning in 1980, Mr. Sampson undertook the representa-

tion of certain limited partners in limited partnerships
organized by Mr. Richins.

2.

On behalf of the limited partners, Mr. Sampson

attempted to work out settlements with Mr. Richins and the
Richtron Companies.
3.

In connection with the settlements, Mr. Sampson

sought to protect the interests of his limited partner clients
by appearing in certain suits on behalf of Richins and certain
of the Richtron Companies.
4.

Mr. Sampson failed to make clear to Mr. Richins and

the Richtron Companies that his involvement in the suits was
solely to protect the interests of his limited partner clients.
5.

Mr. Sampson's appearance in certain cases on behalf

of Mr. Richins and Richtron Companies created a technical
conflict of interest.
6.

Mr. Sampson received money on behalf of his limited

partner clients and disbursed it pursuant to their general
instructions, and did not hold money belonging to the limited
partnerships, Mr. Richins or the Richtron Companies.
7.

Mr. Sampson was careless in documenting trust fund

expenditures and in accounting to his clients.
8.

Mr. Sampson was careless in documenting disbursements

to himself from the trust funds and for payment of legal fees
and expenses.
9.

Mr. Sampson comingled client funds held in his trust

account with his private funds for the purpose of protecting
his private funds from judicial levy.

10.

MTe Sampson purchased, on behalf of limited partner-

ship clients, and for their benefit, a judgment in favor of
Mr* Osborne and against Richins and two Richtron Companies,
but took assignment of the judgment in his own name in violation
of § 78-51-27, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
11.

Many of the allegations made by complainants are not

related to ethical misconduct, and resolution of those issues
should be left to the civil courts.
12.

Mr. Sampson defended on the ground that he did not

represent Mr. Richins and the Richtron Companies and that he
acted at all times in the interest of and under the direction
of his limited partner clients.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Mr. Sampson violated Canon 9, DR 9-101s

A lawyer shall

avoid even the appearance of impropriety; and Canon 5, DR 5-105(B):
A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment, in appearing in
suits on behalf of Mr. Richins and Richtron Companies.
2.

Mr. Sampson violated Canon 9, DR 9-102(A);

All funds

of clients paid to a lawyer shall be deposited in identifiable
bank accounts and no funds belonging to the lawyer shall be
deposited therein, by the comingling of funds.
3.

Mr. Sampson violated Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(5): A lawyer

shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, for his actions in connection with the assignment

of the Osborne judgment.

RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE
The Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah State Bar,
pursuant to Rule VII(e) and Rule IX(1)(D) of the Procedures of
Discipline, recommends to the Board of Bar Commissioners that
John P. Sampson be privately reprimanded for professional
misconduct as above described.

In making this recommendation,

the Committee took into account its belief that there was no
dishonesty, deceit or bad motive in Mr. Sampson's conduct, and
that he was at all times acting in the interest of his limited
partner clients.

Ellen M. Maycock

/—N

ORDER OF BAR COMMISSIONERS
Upon the recommendation of the Committee on Ethics and
Discipline of the Utah State Bar, the Board of Commissioners
hereby privately reprimands John P. Sampson for professional
misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar of this state.
DATED this

&> t

day of )j>u^<Ly

, > 1987.

BOARD^-OF COMMISSIONERS

4^. ~DartT President

COPY OF TRANSCRIPT HEARING ON SEPT. 11, 1986
Pages 26-31
MR, HARMON:
In Objection No. 5, Your Honor, the Court in finding 232
acknowledges that there are damages of a consequential nature and
then, however, the Court does not go on with any to identify what
damages the Court is referring what evidence supports that
particular statement, and then the Court goes on and awards the
$250,000 in favor of the general partners and against Mr.
Sampson.

As we have outlined here on page 5, I think the Court

walked through all the various theories, and then the Court
dispelled most of these theories, and I guess our position is we
don't have any idea, Your Honor, where the $250,000 comes from.

THE COURT:
Do you have any idea when a jury comes in with a verdict for
$25,000 in a $100,000 as to where it got that figure?

I have

seen that hundreds of times in trials that I have presided over.
You don't know how they have arrived at those figures,
generally.
I gave considerable thought to this problem.
guess, one of my major things that I wrestled with.

It was, I
There wasn't

any doubt in my mind based upon the record made during the trial
that John Sampson had intentionally interferred with an existing
economic relationship, and that all of the elements, both the
means and the manner that were spelled out by our Supreme Court
as constituting elements of that particular tort to me were
clearly established by the evidence.

I think you will recall that while I could see Sampsonfs
representation of Richtron companies in various lawsuits was
probably—turned out to be a conflict of interest when he was
also opposing them, and that that might have been a breach of
duty, maybe there was a negligence on the part of Sampson as
alleged in one of the counts.

I felt that while those particular

counts may have been proven insofar as allegations of wrong doing
was concerned, the record didn't present specific evidence that
enabled me to say, yes, because he represented, and I expect
maybe Mr- Anderson might talk about this in his, because he
represented us in a dozen lawsuits, or was supposed to represent
us and failed to do so we had default judgments taken against
us.
The record doesn't tell me what the defendants' damages were
as a result of proximate cause of those factors.

And I felt that

the tort, and I stress the tort aspect of the cause of action
about the intentional interference with an existing economic
relation, and I don't think we'll ever get a more clear cut
example of that being done than we have in
PAGE 27

this case.
But that particular thing was not a contract violation.
Recovery wasn't based upon contract relationships.

It was a tort

just like you run a red light and crash into your car.
a tort and you are injured.
damages.
$100,000.

But how much?

I commit

And you are entitled to recover

Well, the jury says $25,000.

You wanted

You get $25,000, see.

And, so, I considered the evidence at substantial length.
What exactly was the total of the advances made by the general
partners to the limited partners.
know.

I am trying to say I don't

Because various exhibits that came into evidence gave us

different amounts.

$75,000 goes for overhead expenses.

know what they were.
office expenses.

I don't

Maybe they were to pay John Sampson's law

I don't know.

$100,000 goes out to Sampson as attorneys' fees.

Well, I

can't say that he's not entitled to attorneys' fees for all that
he did in this case, and, therefore, I wouldn't say the money was
spent for attorneys' fees or that Sampson took for attorneys1
fees was all wrongfully taken in view of the history of this
thing and, therefore, that's one specific element of damage that
the general partners
PAGE 23

are entitled to recover*
I think if I took the time I could think of other similar
examples.

A factor that I examined closely and brought out in my

findings was Richins1 contention with respect to the value of all
the property which—for which he was seeking millions of dollars
in damages, you see-

Yet on his bankruptcy schedules the value

of the properties listed as being properties in which RFC had an
interest fell far below his $9 and $12 million figures that he
set forth in some of his exhibits.

I have no way of knowing what

value of the loss of those properties could be assessed if any.
I guess I will talk more about this when I hear from Mr.
Anderson.

But I concluded that Richins* conduct was indeed

intentional.

That it was an interference.

I don't mean Richins.

I mean Sampson.

That it was an

interference with an existing economic relationship—several
existing economic relationships.

As I pointed out in seven

months at the end of 1980 he literally controlled all of the
partnerships.

And there is something to be said for his doing

that on the other side of the question, too.
that.

And I recognize

And we111 probably talk about that some more with Mr.

Anderson.
PAGE 29

But the end result is that is the defendants in the case end
up with nothing because of Sampson's conduct.

And I felt that

his conduct justified as a substantial recovery.

And as I said,

I wrestled with my thoughts for hours trying to think of a basis
for fixing a figure, and that's the figure I came up with.
less than what some exhibits claim the advances were.

It's

I think I

pointed out in my findings that the repayment of those advances
had substantial uncertainty if all of the partnerships had been
dissolved and liquidated in an orderly, proper fashion, all
expenses paid and the property sold for the best price they could
collect.
I point out that there still may not have been any money
left to pay all or even part of the advances.

So, I don't think

that the advances gives me necessarily an accurate measure of
damages that I could award to them.

If I had done so it would

be, maybe, $100,000 more than it is.
There were many factors that I weighed and considered and
you see them scattered throughout my findings.
concluded this is a tort.
his conduct.

And, so, I just

Damages was caused by Sampson through

I find it was not such conduct as justified

punitive damages, and will be talking about that, I am sure, but
that the defendants were entitled to a substantial
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recovery-

In no sense of the word could I go to Richins $5

million and $6 million and $9 million and $12 million figures in
arriving at damages because the evidence wasn't there.

Credible

evidence wasn't there that I could accept as being a proper
foundation for a measure of damages.

But I just say that that's

the amount I came up with and I don't think I am obligated to say
that the $250,000 is made up of $250,000 in advances which I
think he would have recovered if they'd have orderly liquidated
all of the partnerships or that it is made up of $100,000
attorneys' fees Sampson took plus the $75,000 that he used for
overhead, plus another $75,000 for some other specific item.
You see, and that's the reason I did what I did, and I don't
think I can really—need to do or can do any different.
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